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Extractive industries accounting and economic consequences: 
past, present and future 
 
Abstract 
 
Accounting for the extractive industries has been a contested 
issue for decades as a result of a choice of different methods of 
costing available and the economic impacts of these methods on 
companies’ financial results.  When the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) embarked on its extractive industries 
project in 1998, it attempted to create uniform accounting 
practices.  An archival study of constituent responses to the 
IASB’s Issues Paper revealed that the economic consequences 
argument was relied upon again to argue for retaining choice.  
The IASB’s international accounting standard, IFRS 6, issued in 
2004, once again permitted choice between methods, illustrating 
the effectiveness of the economic consequences argument in 
perpetuating past practice. 
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standards, financial reporting. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic consequences, defined as the “impact of accounting reports on the 
decision-making behaviour of business, government, unions, investors and creditors”, 
were identified as a substantive issue in accounting policy making during the 1970s, 
representing a “veritable revolution in accounting thought” (Zeff, 1978, p. 56).  As 
awareness of the economic consequences of accounting information increased, the 
notion of accounting as a technical and neutral practice gave way to perspectives 
which recognised accounting in its social and political contexts (Rappaport, 1977; 
Solomons, 1978; Zeff, 1978).  The increasing influence of “outside forces” in the 
accounting standard setting process was considered by Zeff (1978, p. 56) who 
identified the way in which individuals and groups used the economic consequences 
argument to state their case for or against a particular accounting pronouncement .  
One of the early uses of the economic consequences argument in accounting 
standard setting emerged in the debate concerning accounting for unsuccessful 
exploration activity in the petroleum industry in the United States (US) during the late 
1960s. The full cost method first gained popularity in the US in the 1960s, primarily 
among small and medium sized exploration companies wishing to improve the 
appearance of their financial statements (Van Riper, 1994, p. 56).  In 1964, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants commissioned a study to 
investigate the successful efforts versus full cost issue, the results of which were 
published in 1969 and recommended the narrowing of accounting practices and 
supported the use of the successful efforts method.  However, oil and gas companies 
were successful in persuading the US accounting standard setter to postpone 
consideration of the different costing methods available, arguing that a switch of 
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methods would adversely affect the performance and growth of small, independent 
exploration companies (Zeff, 1978).  While this controversy came to the fore in the 
1960s, the need for a standardised approach to extractive industries accounting was 
recognised as early as 1905: 
I hope that the time is approaching when the system of 
standardisation will be extended to mining costs and 
mining accounts.  At the present the methods for each of 
these are legion, and seem designed to conceal rather than 
reveal the financial position; but there must be some one 
method, in accounts especially, which is best of all (Curle, 
1905, p. 29, cited in Luther, 1996, p. 67). 
Despite the early and repeated recognition of a need for a standardised 
approach and the amount of controversy this issue has generated, Wise and Spear 
(2000, p. 30) recently observed that accounting and disclosure practice of enterprises 
engaged in the extractive industries can “at best be described as inadequate and might 
reasonably be referred to as an outstanding example of accounting flexibility”.   
The debate resurfaced again at an international level in 1998 when the then 
IASC added to its agenda a project aimed at addressing accounting and disclosure 
issues in the extractive industries (International Accounting Standards Committee, 
2000a).  The IASC recognised the difficulties and uncertainties associated with 
accounting in the extractive industries, and that the resultant divergence in accounting 
policies and practices had been significant inhibitors to the comparability of mining 
companies (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).  However, 
despite the proposal of the IASC to have only one costing method, the eventual 
outcome of the project, International Financial Reporting Standard 6 (IFRS 6), was 
merely codified existing industry practice thereby perpetuating choice between 
accounting methods.   
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The objective of this study is to place the ongoing full cost versus successful 
efforts controversy with its historical context and explain how the economic 
consequences argument has been, and continues to be, used by powerful extractive 
industries players to thwart standard setters’ efforts to eliminate full cost accounting 
and thereby perpetuate the status quo of choice in accounting methods.  In the 
following section, the economic consequences associated with extractive activities 
and the accounting methods that developed over time to cope with the risks associated 
with extractive operations are considered.  The paper then outlines the history of the 
full cost versus successful efforts debate and the early attempts of the US accounting 
standard setter to achieve consensus on this issue and limit accounting alternatives.  
Next it charts the progress of the IASB’s extractive industries project and the 
influence of key constituents on the outcome of the project.  This is followed by a 
discussion of the likely influence of extractive industries constituents on the 
international accounting standard setting process in the future, and the continuation of 
the economic consequences argument.  Finally, conclusions are presented, along with 
limitations and opportunities for further research.   
2. The economic consequences of extractive 
industries accounting 
The extractive industries have been defined as the petroleum (oil and gas) and 
mining industries that are involved in “finding and removing wasting natural 
resources located in or near the earth’s crust” (International Accounting Standards 
Committee, 2000a, p. 14).  The process of finding these natural resources is referred 
to as the pre-production phase and involves those exploration and evaluation activities 
that are undertaken to determine whether a resource deposit exists, and whether its 
extraction is economically viable (International Accounting Standards Committee, 
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2000a).  The risks associated with extractive operations are significant, and have been 
described as “endemic to the industry” (Wise & Spear, 2002, p. 3).  The exploration 
and evaluation phase is arguably the most risky given the high proportion of dry holes 
relative to successful projects (Katz, 1985; Wise & Spear, 2002).  Companies may 
spend millions of dollars on an exploration effort only to find that variables such as 
development and production risk, changing technology, time horizons, market risk, 
and the legal and political environment render the project uneconomical.   
The costs associated with these pre-production activities are accounting for 
according to historical cost conventions (Bryant, 2003).  There are several different 
methods that have developed over time to determine the value of these costs, with the 
most common being the full cost and successful efforts methods.  Under the full cost 
method, all acquisition, exploration, and drilling costs, including those relating to 
unsuccessful activities, may be capitalised and carried forward until such time as they 
can be written off against revenue from successful projects (Flory & Grossman, 
1978).  In contrast, under the successful efforts method, only those pre-production 
costs that relate directly to successful projects can be matched against revenue from 
the successful project (Katz, 1985).  The choice of method produces different results, 
as demonstrated by the example in Exhibit 1. 
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This example provides evidence of the impact that a change in accounting 
methods has on a company’s income figure.  The economic consequence of using the 
full cost method is a 23 percent increase in reported income over the successful efforts 
result.  Other examples of the economic consequences of a change in costing method 
include Conquest, a petroleum company based in North America, which reported in 
1985 as a full cost company, posting a $3.7 million profit, but later restated its results 
under successful efforts accounting and recorded a $17.1 million loss (Editorial, 
1986).  Premier Oil, an oil producer based in the UK, also switched accounting 
methods from full cost to successful efforts in 2004, resulting in a downward 
restatement of profits from $44 million to $22 million (Neveling, 2005).   
Full cost Successful efforts
Revenue
(1 million barrels at $50 each) $50,000,000 $50,000,000
Expenses
Cost of unsuccessful efforts (3 sites) not applicable $12,000,000
Cost of goods sold* $2,000,000 $800,000
Total expenses $2,000,000 $12,800,000
Income $48,000,000 $37,200,000
$20,000,000 x 1,000,000
10,000,000
$8,000,000 x 1,000,000
10,000,000
Adapted from Amernic (1979, p.36)
Cost of goods sold under the full cost 
method = 
Cost of goods sold under the successful 
efforts method = 
Exhibit 1: the income effect of using the successful efforts versus full cost methods
Assume that a petroleum company spends $4 million on exploration in each of five drilling
sites during 2001 and that the company discovers oil on two of the sites. The other three
sites are "dry holes", that is, unsuccessful projects. The two productive sites are expected
to produce ten million barrels of oil, one million of which are produced and sold for $50
each during 2001. The full cost versus the successful efforts results are shown below,
assuming no taxes or other expenses.
* Pre-production costs are typically amortised on a units of production basis regardless of 
whether the full cost or successful efforts method is used (Flory & Grossman, 1978; Katz, 
1985).  Therefore, cost of goods sold is calculated by dividing the total cost by the 
expected units of production and multiplying this by the number of units produced and sold 
during the period.  
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In each of these three examples, a higher profit was reported under full cost 
accounting, but this may not always be the case.  The accounting method that 
produces the most favourable results depends on whether the reporting entity is small 
and in its early stages of exploration, or larger and more able to absorb the cost of 
unsuccessful efforts. Consequently, one method is not favourable to all companies.  
This has resulted in controversy when accounting standard setters attempted to 
prohibit use of the full cost method to achieve uniformity in reporting, with the 
economic consequences of these differing results being used as an argument for the 
continuation of choice in accounting methods.1   
Despite frequent and early calls for standardisation of extractive industries 
accounting there has been surprisingly little regulation, arguably because of the 
economic significance and associated influence of this sector (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, 2001b; Luther, 1996; Wise & Spear, 2000).  Economically, the extractive 
industries are a powerful force, with many of the major extractive industries 
companies being richer and more powerful than the states and even countries that seek 
to regulate them (Global Policy Forum, 2006).  Indeed, a report by Anderson and 
Cavanagh (2000) found that, of the largest 100 economies in the world, 51 were 
global corporations and only 49 were countries. Included in this list of global 
corporations were international petroleum companies ExxonMobil, the Royal 
Dutch/Shell Group, BP, E.On, and TOTAL (Anderson & Cavanagh, 2000).  Updating 
Anderson and Cavanagh’s (2000) statistics with current information shows that six of 
the world’s top twelve companies are from the extractive industries, being BP, 
Chevron/Texaco, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, the Royal Dutch/Shell group, and 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that there is no difference in the underlying economic reality regardless of whether 
the full cost or successful efforts method is used and, ultimately, capital markets will adjust prices 
depending on the method employed.  The economic consequences argument, therefore, is primarily 
used in support of a particular lobbying position. 
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TOTAL (Fortune Magazine, 2005).  In 2005, these six companies recorded combined 
revenues in excess of US$1.2 trillion and profits of US$92 billion (Fortune Magazine, 
2005).  Comparing the combined revenues of these six global companies with current 
US Gross Domestic Product of US$11 trillion (World Bank, 2005) gives some 
perspective of the enormous economic strength of the major international extractive 
industries companies.            
Given the significant economic consequences of the choice of accounting 
method, it is hardly surprising that extractive industries companies have favoured 
flexible reporting practices that enable them to choose the methods of accounting for 
pre-production activities that present their activities in the most favourable manner.  
The seeming unwillingness of legislators and accounting standard setting bodies to 
regulate the reporting of extractive industries companies may indeed be because of the 
economic significance and associated political influence of the enterprises and the 
distinctive nature of their activities.  The next section traces the history of the 
successful efforts versus full cost debate, which has been described as the “first full-
blown controversy about an accounting standard and probably the most intensely 
politicised accounting argument ever” (Van Riper, 1994, p.56).   
   
3. The past: a history of the debate 
The full cost versus successful efforts controversy first came to prominence in 
the US during the 1960s.  The full cost method had gained popularity among small 
and medium sized exploration companies wanting to improve the appearance of their 
financial statements (Van Riper, 1994).  The method, dubbed “no-cost accounting” by 
its critics, was adopted by hundreds of companies that argued full cost accounting was 
essential to their capital raising efforts and therefore enabled them to pursue 
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exploration programs that would be oil reserves and ultimately benefit all of the US 
(Van Riper, 1994, p. 56).  The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) commissioned a study in 1964 to investigate the full cost versus successful 
efforts issue, the results of which supported the use of the successful efforts method 
(Flory & Grossman, 1978; Van Riper, 1994, p. 56).  The study was reviewed again in 
1970 with a view to narrowing alternative practices (Flory & Grossman, 1978, p. 56; 
Van Riper, 1994).  However, when the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) took over accounting standard setting responsibility from the AICPA in 1973, 
it declined to add oil and gas accounting to its agenda, a move which has been 
described as an exercise of “caution, or even wisdom” (Van Riper, 1994, p. 56).   
In that same year the world oil crisis took hold, leading to a shortage of oil 
exports from the Middle East and a quadrupling of world oil prices (Fehner & Holl, 
1994).  These conditions underscored the importance of countries having their own 
sources of energy, or at least having companies willing to seek energy sources. The 
energy crisis demonstrated the need for unified energy organisation and planning and 
it became evident that energy and conservation legislation would be enacted (Fehner 
& Holl, 1994; Van Riper, 1994, p. 55).  In anticipation of this legislation, the FASB 
then added to its agenda a project aimed at addressing issues related to financial 
accounting and reporting for exploration and development costs in the extractive 
industries (Van Riper, 1994, p. 57).   
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act, which came into effect on 22 
December 1975, stipulated that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
establish standardised accounting practices for the extractive industries within two 
years (Katz, 1985).  Foreshadowing the FASB’s inclusion of the project on its agenda, 
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the SEC subsequently delegated the responsibility of setting the accounting standard 
to the FASB, however the provisions of the Act specified that the SEC’s final 
approval of the standard was required (Van Riper, 1994, p. 55).  A task force, 
comprising 18 members including company executives, accountants, financial 
analysts, and investment bankers with special expertise in the oil and gas industry, 
was established to lead the project and develop the accounting standard.   
At the end of March 1977, a discussion memorandum was published which 
was followed by an Exposure Draft, Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and 
Gas Producing Companies, in July of that year, five months before the statutory 
deadline set out by the Act.  These documents proposed that the successful efforts 
method be mandated as the single method of accounting for oil and gas pre-
production costs (Flory & Grossman, 1978; Van Riper, 1994, p. 62).  Following the 
release of the Exposure Draft, the oil and gas industry launched an intense lobbying 
effort against the proposals.  This lobbying effort was led by the smaller, independent 
oil and gas companies that used and relied on the full cost method to account for their 
exploration activity.  Proponents of the full cost method stressed the importance of 
accounting methods which promoted aggressive exploration programs, given the 
energy shortages in the US at the time.  At a public debate concerning the FASB’s 
proposals, the founder of Mesa Petroleum, T. Boone Pickens, stated that the full cost 
method had enabled his company to capitalise its exploration costs and grow its assets 
from US$4 million to US$600 in 12 years, and to increase revenues from US$1.5 
million to US$100 million over that period (Van Riper, 1994).  Pickens said that had 
the elimination of full cost accounting been proposed at the time his company was 
formed, he would have “probably been on [his] knees, pleading for full cost 
accounting” (Pickens, 1977, cited in Van Riper, 1994, p. 59).  Full cost companies 
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argued that the successful efforts method would curtail the US oil and gas industry 
because it discouraged companies from engaging in exploration, especially risky 
ventures, for fear of having immediately to write off the cost of unsuccessful efforts 
(Katz, 1985; Van Riper, 1994, p. 61).   
In the light of this pressure, the SEC decided against its original plan to adopt 
whatever decision the FASB made, and agreed instead to review the FASB’s 
pronouncements, hold public hearings and solicit written comments on the issue early 
in 1978 (Van Riper, 1994, p. 65).  During the ensuing period, an Ad Hoc Committee 
on Full Costing was formed by industry constituents to target high level political 
leaders at the SEC, Washington Senate, Department of Energy, Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission (Van Riper, 1994).  Many on the receiving end of 
this lobbying commented that they had “never seen such aggressive lobbying in their 
Washington careers” and described the issue as “improperly politicised” (Gorton, 
1991, p.30 cited in Van Riper, 1994, p. 64).   
Finally, the “clout” of the independent oil and gas companies prevailed.  On 
29 August 1978, the SEC officially withdrew its support for the FASB’s proposed 
accounting standard, Statement No. 19, Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil 
and Gas Producing Companies, marking the only instance (at that stage) in which the 
SEC had declined to support the FASB (Van Riper, 1994, p. 70).  Statement No. 19 
was left in place but was amended by Statement No. 25, which suspended its effective 
date indefinitely.  This meant that oil and gas companies could continue to use either 
the full cost or successful efforts method (Katz, 1985).  At the same time, the SEC 
also concluded that neither the full cost nor the successful efforts method provided 
relevant information for decision making, proposing instead to develop a “reserve 
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recognition” method which would eventually become the required method of 
accounting (Johnston, 2005; Katz, 1985; Macintosh & Baker, 2002; Van Riper, 1994, 
p. 70).  However, in February 1981 the SEC abandoned the project and instead 
endorsed FASB Statement No. 69, Disclosures about Oil and Gas Producing 
Activities.  This Statement was issued to improve the quality of financial reporting in 
the oil and gas industry but was considered a compromise in the light of the failure to 
achieve uniformity in financial reporting (Katz, 1985; Van Riper, 1994, p. 70).   
While this debate was raging in the US, Australia’s standard setting body2 
released its first exposure draft on accounting for the extractive industries in February 
1973, coinciding with a “mini-boom” in the primary products and minerals export 
markets (Whittred et al., 1996, p. 397).  Shortly thereafter, the Australian economy 
entered a recession and it was almost four years after the exposure draft that 
Statement of Accounting Standards DS12 was released in 1976 (Whittred et al., 1996, 
p. 397).  This was significant because Australia was the first and only country to have 
a standard developed specifically for the extractive industries.  The standard 
essentially dealt with accounting for exploration and evaluation expenditure, and 
required that these pre-production costs be expensed.  However it did permit that, 
under certain circumstances, these costs could be carried forward, but only to the 
extent that they had been incurred in the two years immediately preceding the 
reporting date (Whittred et al., 1996, p. 397).  These requirements had not appeared in 
the exposure draft and, prior to the release of the standard, most companies’ 
capitalised pre-production expenditure until the mine site was abandoned.  The 
provisions of DS12 were vehemently opposed by extractive industries companies, 
particularly by smaller exploration companies that argued they could not afford to 
                                                 
2 The Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) that initiated this process has since been reformed 
and renamed and is now the Australia Accounting Standards Board (AASB). 
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write off exploration expenditure against income each year (Whittred et al., 1996, p. 
397).   
In response to pressure from extractive industries companies, DS12 was 
revised and reissued in December 1977 without the two year limitation for 
capitalisation of pre-production expenses (Whittred et al., 1996, p. 397).  In other 
words, this meant that Australian companies were to use a derivative of the successful 
efforts method, the area-of-interest method.3  The standard was again reissued, 
without amendment, as Australian Accounting Standard 7 (AAS 7) in August 1979.  
The provisions of AAS 7 were then incorporated into AASB 1022: Accounting for the 
extractive industries, which received statutory backing in October 1989 (Whittred et 
al., 1996, p. 397).   
While in Australia choice was limited by the requirement that extractive 
industries companies adopt a successful efforts method, specifically the area-of-
interest method, both the successful efforts and full cost methods continued to be 
permitted for use by extractive industries companies in the US, as well as Canada and 
the UK, which also followed US practice (Amernic, 1979; Pratt, 1990).  While many 
of the major extractive industries corporations, such as ExxonMobil, BP and the 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group, used the successful efforts method, full cost accounting 
continued to be popular with smaller companies that relied on this method to help 
build asset reserves and improve profit figures, which in turn assisted them with debt 
                                                 
3 An area of interest was defined as an individual geological area and usually comprised a single mine 
or deposit, or a separate oil or gas field (Australian Accounting Standards Board, 1989, p. 5).  Like the 
successful efforts method, under the area-of-interest method, pre-production costs were to be 
capitalised if they related to a successful project, and were matched against revenues from the project 
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).  The costs were to be capitalised also if the 
stage of the project prohibited an assessment of the viability of the area-of-interest (Australian 
Accounting Standards Board, 1989, p. 8).  Consistent with the successful efforts method, if pre-
production costs related to an unsuccessful project, they were to be written off as incurred or once that 
assessment was made (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a). 
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financing and capital raising (Baker, 1976; British Petroleum plc, 2004; ExxonMobil 
Corporation, 2005; Frazier & Ingersoll, 1986; International Accounting Standards 
Committee, 2000a; Royal Dutch/Shell Group, 2004; Van Riper, 1994, p. 58).  The 
debate was not over however, with the emergence of the IASC and its recognition that 
accounting for the extractive industries was an international accounting issue.   
4. The present: the IASB’s extractive industries project 
Given the history of this debate, it might be imagined that there were lessons 
to be learned which would assist the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB)4 in its efforts to respond to the need for a global accounting standard.  The 
international prominence, economic influence, and divergent accounting practices of 
the extractive industries were listed as factors contributing to the importance of the 
project, which aimed to address accounting measurement and disclosure issues 
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).  The project was led by an 
internationally representative Steering Committee, with members from Australia, 
Canada, Germany, India, Italy, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), 
and the US (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a; Micallef, 2001).5  
The Steering Committee members’ professional backgrounds were varied and 
included chartered accountants, company executives, academics, and financial 
analysts.   
The Steering Committee reached its first milestone in November 2000, with 
the publication of the Extractive Industries Issues Paper.   The Issues Paper was a 412 
                                                 
4 The process of developing an international accounting standard for the extractive industries was first 
undertaken by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and has been continued by 
the International Accounting Standards Board since its restructure in 2000.  Therefore, where relevant, 
this paper refers to the IASC/IASB. 
5 The Chairman of the Steering Committee, Ken Spencer, was the former Chairman of the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).    
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page document consisting of 16 chapters, which raised a number of “Basic Issues” 
concerning matters such as reserve estimation and valuation, recognition and 
measurement of inventories, and financial statement disclosures (International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).  It was published with an invitation for 
interested parties to comment by 30 June 2001 on the matters raised.  In addition, 
given the “widespread interest” in the project, the Steering Committee also sent the 
Issues Paper to “senior financial officers of nearly 300 extractive industries companies 
worldwide” with a direct request for comment (International Accounting Standards 
Committee, 2000b, p. 19).  To guide commentators, the Issues Paper set out the 
Steering Committee’s tentative views on some of the issues considered most 
significant and stated that “the Steering Committee favours adoption of a method 
more consistent with the successful efforts concept than with the other concepts” 
(International Accounting Standards Committee 2000a, p. 88).  
Respondents to the Issues Paper were required to indicate their preferences on 
the Basic Issues raised and thereby indicate their agreement or disagreement with the 
Steering Committee’s tentative views.  Fifty-two responses were received from 
constituents located in countries including Australia, Canada, China, Germany, South 
Africa, the UK, and the US.  The principal activities of the respondents were varied 
and included mining and petroleum companies, extractive industries lobby groups, 
international accounting firms, professional accounting bodies, standard setting 
bodies, and academics (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2001).   
Preliminary content-type analysis revealed that 85 percent of respondents that 
commented on the full cost versus successful efforts issue supported the Steering 
Committee’s proposal to eliminate full cost accounting and require companies to 
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report using the successful efforts method.  This analysis, however, was considered to 
be limited in three respects: first, who is making a particular argument and what is 
being said is masked by the aggregation of responses.  Secondly, the relationships 
between the respondents and other key (but perhaps less visible) participants in the 
process remains hidden.   Finally, based on the preliminary analysis, there appeared to 
be little conflict among respondents with respect to the full cost versus successful 
efforts issue, which is contrary to the long-standing and intense debate that has 
surrounded this matter.  To overcome these limitations and investigate the responses 
in greater detail, a critical discourse analysis of respondents and their responses was 
undertaken to gain greater insight into the relationships between constituents, the 
arguments presented, and how these arguments influenced the outcome of the 
international accounting standard setting process. 
Unsurprisingly, the respondents that supported the proposal to eliminate the 
full cost method were the major extractive industries companies, or organisations 
representing these companies such as external audit firms, that were already using the 
successful efforts method.  In contrast, those respondents that argued for the 
preservation of choice in accounting methods were small, independent exploration 
companies arguing that they relied on the full cost method to improve the appearance 
of their financial statements and adequately reflect their business operations.  In 
addition, the petroleum industry lobby groups also argued strongly for the 
preservation of both the successful efforts and full cost methods of accounting for 
exploration and evaluation costs.  Both of these groups of constituents used the 
economic consequences argument in support of their responses.  Excerpts from the 
comment letters that used this argument are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Using the economic consequences argument to support retention of both the full 
cost and successful efforts methods 
Constituent Nature of operations Issues Paper response 
Paladin Resources plc Independent oil and 
gas exploration and 
production company 
based in the UK. 
"We strongly believe that both successful 
efforts and full cost methods of accounting 
for petroleum activities should be retained.  
The methods used to account for costs 
should reflect the size and nature of a 
particular company's activities and this 
cannot be achieved if a single successful 
efforts method is adopted.  Investors in 
newer and smaller companies will be looking 
at totally different performance criteria to 
those required from more established and 
larger companies" (Paladin Resources plc, 
2001, p. 1) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
      
     
American Petroleum 
Institute (API) 
Petroleum industry 
lobby group 
representing over 400 
member companies 
involved in all aspects 
of the oil and natural 
gas industry. 
"The US oil and gas industry has accounted 
for its operations in accordance with 
[standards that have] provided the flexibility 
to account for the petroleum industry under 
either a successful efforts concept or a full 
cost concept.  When the [issue] was first 
considered 20+ years ago there was much 
debate between the successful efforts and 
full cost concepts and that debate continues 
today.  We support the practice of allowing 
an enterprise to choose among the 
successful efforts and full cost accounting 
models in the primary financial statements" 
(American Petroleum Institute, 2001, p. 2). 
      
     
Oil Industry Accounting 
Committee (OIAC) 
UK oil and gas industry 
lobby group formed to 
represent the views of 
industry constituents in 
various accounting 
forums. 
"OIAC is of the view that it would be wrong 
to restrict companies to using one method of 
allocating costs.  The way that decisions are 
made on prospecting and exploration activity 
by major companies and by the smaller 
"independent" sector can be very different.  
Indeed the majority of UK listed [exploration] 
companies account under the full cost 
method.  In practice, OIAC considers that 
the choice of selecting either successful 
efforts or full cost enables companies to 
properly reflect their particular decision 
taking process in their financial statements, 
and therefore should be retained" Oil 
Industry Accounting Committee, 2001, p. 2).     
   
      
     
Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 
Professional 
accounting body.  An 
Advisory Committee 
was established to 
develop the response, 
"Junior mining companies play a very 
significant role in the Canadian mining 
industry and the accounting standards 
should address the needs of these 
companies, their shareholders and other 
  
 19
comprising 
representatives from 
ten Canadian mining 
and petroleum 
companies plus two 
audit partners with 
extensive backgrounds 
in the extractive 
industries. 
users of their financial statements.  The full 
cost method is extensively used in Canada.  
A transition to successful efforts should only 
be done following consultations with affected 
companies, including the development of 
clear and practical transition rules" 
(Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, 2001, p. 5). 
 
As shown in Table 1, the arguments for the retention of both methods focus on 
allowing flexibility in reporting methods, providing an accurate reflection of 
management decisions, and supporting the needs of the smaller, independent 
exploration companies.  These arguments mirror those that were advanced by full cost 
proponents during the FASB’s attempt to narrowing accounting alternatives for the oil 
and gas industry in the 1960s and 1970s.  Interestingly, it was the strength of the 
lobbying efforts of coalitions of full cost proponents, similar to the API and the 
OIAC, which prevented the FASB from eliminating the full cost method.  With the 
IASB also unable to achieve consensus on this matter, and instead issuing a standard 
which perpetuates choice in accounting methods, it appears that there is a clear case of 
history repeating itself. 
At the time the Issues Paper was published, the IASC was in the midst of 
restructuring.  Plans for the development of the extractive industries project came with 
the caveat that “the restructured IASC Board will have to decide its own agenda and 
priorities”, and indeed it did (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a, 
p. 5).  In July 2001, the IASB announced that it would restart the project only when 
agenda time permitted (International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 
2003, 2004).  Then, in September 2002, the IASB announced that it was not feasible 
to complete a comprehensive extractive industries project and formulate an 
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international accounting standard by 1 January 2005, the deadline set for the adoption 
of international accounting standards in many jurisdictions (International Accounting 
Standards Board, 2004a).   
Instead, on 15 January 2004, the IASB issued Exposure Draft 6 Exploration 
for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources (ED 6) (International Accounting Standards 
Board, 2004c).  The Exposure Draft was intended to make limited improvements to 
accounting practices for exploration and evaluation activities and was considered an 
interim measure in lieu of a comprehensive international accounting standard for the 
extractive industries.  The purpose of the proposed standard was to enable those 
entities reporting exploration and evaluation assets to comply with IFRS6 while not 
requiring major changes that may need to be revised once a comprehensive extractive 
industries project was completed (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004c).    
The essence of the Exposure Draft was that existing extractive industries 
companies could continue to use the accounting policies already in place before the 
application of IFRS (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004b).  Therefore, 
no accounting changes were required to be made by extractive industries entities in 
order to comply with IFRS.  In terms of the successful efforts versus full cost issue, 
this meant that companies were permitted to continue to use whichever method was 
deemed most appropriate by management.  Exposure Draft 6 proposed that companies 
would be required to perform an impairment test on exploration and evaluation assets, 
however, apart from this requirement, the status quo was to remain largely unchanged 
                                                 
6 When the extractive industries project was initiated, the standards developed by the IASC were 
known as International Accounting Standards (IASs).  When the IASC was restructured and renamed 
the IASB in 2001, the IASB also renamed the accounting standards to International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs).  The standards issued by the IASC continue to be designated IASs 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2004a).  Although the international accounting standard for 
the extractive industries was commenced by the IASC, the final standard was issued by the IASB, and 
so is referred to as an International Financial Reporting Standard. 
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for the extractive industries (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004c).     
The comment period for the Exposure Draft was open until 16 April 2004.  
Unsurprisingly, given the absence of any substantial changes to existing accounting 
practices, there was little opposition to the proposals of the Exposure Draft.  The 
proposals were later incorporated into IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of 
Mineral Assets, which was published on 9th December 2004, to take effect from 1 
January 2005 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004c).  The chronology of 
the extractive industries project undertaken by the IASC, and carried over by the 
IASB, is also summarised in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 2, six years elapsed between the commencement of the 
project and the issue of IFRS 6.  Significantly, even with the international accounting 
standard in place, there continues to be no definitive accounting guidance for 
extractive industries companies.  Instead, IFRS 6 merely codifies established, 
disparate, and largely unregulated industry practice.  As noted, in the US case, where 
“using its considerable political might, the industry succeeded in persuading the board 
to postpone consideration of the sensitive subject” (Van Riper, 1994, p. 219), it 
April 1998 Extractive industries project was added to the IASC agenda and an Extractive 
Industries Steering Committee was established by the IASC.
November 2000 Extractive Industries Issues Paper was published and opened for public comment.
April 2001 Restructured Board introduced.  IASC becomes the IASB.
June 2001 Comments due in respect of Issues Paper.
July 2001 Restructured IASB postpones consideration of extractive industries project.
September 2002 IASB decides against completing a comprehensive extractive industries standard for 
adoption in 2005.
January 2004 Exposure Draft ED 6, Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources issued and 
opened for public comment.
April 2004 Comments due in respect of ED 6.
December 2004 IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Assets issued by the IASB for 
adoption in 2005.
Table 2: Chronology of the IASC/IASB extractive industries project
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appears that in the international arena history has again repeated itself.  As shown in 
the following section, it appears that the status quo may continue for some time. 
5. The future: the IASB’s extractive activities research 
project 
 
On the date IFRS 6 was released, the IASB also announced that it had formed 
a group of national standard setters from Australia, Canada, Norway, and South 
Africa to undertake a comprehensive research project that would work towards 
resolving the accounting issues faced by extractive industries entities (International 
Accounting Standards Board, 2006a).  An advisory panel was established to provide 
advice throughout the project, comprised of individuals from entities engaged in the 
extractive industries, analysts and other users of financial reports, auditors, and 
securities regulators.  The advisory panel members are summarised, according to the 
groups they represent, in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 reveals that the majority of panel members are drawn from oil and gas 
and mining companies.  On the one hand, this appears reasonable because the panel is 
able to rely on the expertise and experience of these members, however this group of 
constituents also has the most to lose or gain from changes to the accounting methods 
available to them for reporting.  This situation arguably contributes to the 
Oil and gas 
companies
Mining 
companies Auditors
Analysts and 
other users
Securities 
regulators Total
Africa 1 2 1 2 6
Asia-Pacific 3 3 1 1 8
Europe 3 3 1 1 8
North America 3 1 2 1 1 8
Total 10 9 5 4 2 30
Constituent representation
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
c 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n
Table 3: Advisory panel members, according to representation
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development of a dependency relationship between the standard setter and the 
industry it is attempting to regulate.  As noted by Cousins and Sikka (1993, p. 53), the 
information gathered during the due process may be “controlled by the very 
people/groups who are being called to account”.  In other words, the “facts” 
surrounding an issue may be shaped by the priorities and influence of powerful groups 
who wish to maintain the status quo (Cousins and Sikka, 1993, p. 4).   
The most recent board discussion on the extractive activities research project 
was an IASB Education Session held at the IASB’s head office on 16 October 2006.  
The information paper distributed to observers for this discussion considered the 
viability of the fair value method as a basis for measurement and disclosure of 
reserves and resources (International Accounting Standards Board, 2006b).  It also 
noted that historical cost models (for example the full cost and successful efforts 
methods) were preferred by industry constituents for measurement and disclosure 
purposes.   
The possibility of a fair value basis of accounting was canvassed during the 
Issues Paper stage of the project, with many respondents relying on economic 
consequences to argue against this proposal.  For example, BHP Ltd argued that, 
although fair values provide more useful information to the users of financial 
statements, many factors impede objective or reliable valuation and would result in 
significant fluctuations between reporting periods (BHP Ltd, 2001).  Similar 
arguments were advanced by Deloitte (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2001a) and KPMG 
(KPMG, 2001).  The Oil Industry Accounting Committee argued in a similar vein that 
using the fair value approach would make the market “very sensitive to the short term 
views of the prices of the commodities being produced and this could bring significant 
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swings to the carrying amounts which would not add to the usefulness of financial 
statements” (Oil Industry Accounting Committee, 2001, p. 5).   
While the October 2006 discussion session concluded that a comprehensive 
analysis of these methods was required to ensure that the Board has a “solid platform 
upon which to engage with industry and users on accounting for extractive 
industries”, a discussion paper based on this analysis was not expected to be issued 
before mid 2007 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2006b).  Given the 
preliminary views of constituents gathered during the Issues Paper stage, and the 
profile of the Advisory Panel members, it is likely that a choice of historical cost 
bases for measurement and disclosure of reserves will be retained at least in the 
medium term.   
 6. Conclusions  
This paper has traced the way in which the economic consequences argument 
has been used by extractive industries constituents as a means of maintaining choice 
in accounting methods and financial reporting.  It has focussed on the controversy 
surrounding the two main methods of accounting for pre-production activities in the 
extractive industries, successful efforts and full cost.  Much of the early debate was 
centred in the US, where the efforts of the FASB to limit choice were thwarted by the 
SEC, responding to pressure exerted by extractive industries constituents.  However, 
choice was limited in Australia, the only country to develop an industry-wide 
accounting standard which specified the use of the area-of-interest method, a 
derivative of the successful efforts method.  The IASC reignited the debate when it 
established its extractive industries project in 1998.  However, the eventual outcome 
of the project, IFRS 6, failed to eliminate choice and instead merely codified existing 
industry practice.   
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The futile efforts of the IASB to change the status quo replicate the history of 
the debate in the US and the inability of the FASB to effect change.  In both cases, 
there was an initial recognition that accounting across the industry ought to be 
standardised and comparable.  The inclusion of the extractive industries issues on the 
agenda of both the FASB and the IASC was followed in both cases by a process 
whereby constituents were able to influence the outcome to achieve perpetuation of 
accounting flexibility.  The economic strength of the extractive industries, and 
associated lobbying influence, arguably intensified the weight of their arguments for 
the retention of both the full cost and successful efforts methods of accounting for 
exploration and evaluation costs.  This influence is likely to continue in the future and 
could be the subject of further investigation. 
The focus of this paper has been limited to an overview and a preliminary 
explanation of the way history has repeated itself in the matter of accounting for the 
extractive industries.  It requires further investigation, either from an internal point of 
view from within the standard setting body (Walker, 1987) or from a more detailed 
examination of the constituents and their relationship with, and responses to, the 
IASC/IASB.  The high stakes involved in the extractive industries worldwide, the 
necessity of the IASB to maintain a transparent independence in the setting of 
international accounting standards, and the continuation of the IASB’s extractive 
industries research project, make further investigation into this issue imperative.  
 
 
 
 
  
 26
References 
Amernic, J.H. (1979). Accounting practices in the Canadian petroleum industry. CA 
Magazine, 112(3), 34-38. 
Anderson, S. & Cavanagh, J. (2000). Top 200: the rise of global corporate power. 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/top200.htm. 
Baker, C.R. (1976). Defects in full cost accounting in the petroleum industry. Abacus, 
12 (2), 152-158. 
BHP Ltd. (2001). Comment letter. 
http://www.iasb.org/current/comment_letters_iasc.asp. 
British Petroleum plc. (2004). Annual Report. 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=2011266&contentId=201
7033 
Bryant, L. (2003). Relative value relevance of the successful efforts and full cost 
accounting methods in the oil and gas industry. Review of Accounting Studies, 8(1), 
5-28. 
Cousins, J. & Sikka, P. (1993). Accounting for change: Facilitating power and 
accountability. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 4(1), 53-73. 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. (2001a). Comment letter. 
http://www.iasb.org/current/comment_letters_iasc.asp. 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. (2001b). IASC's Extractive Industries Issues Paper. 
http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/pubs.htm#mar2001 
Editorial. (1986). Oil accounting methods: you earn your money and take your choice. 
Wall Street Journal.  
ExxonMobil Corporation. (2005). Annual Report. 
http://ir.exxonmobil.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=115024&p=irol-reportsAnnual 
Fehner, T.R. & Holl, J.M. (1994). Department of Energy 1977-1994 A summary 
history. http://www.mbe.doe.gov/me70/history/Summary_History.pdf.  
Flory, S.M. & Grossman, S.D. (1978). New oil and gas accounting requirements. The 
CPA Journal, 48(5), 39-43. 
Fortune Magazine. (2005). Fortune Global 500 2005. 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/ 
Frazier, S. & Ingersoll, B. (1986). SEC staff proposes accounting shift for oil 
industry. Wall Street Journal  
Global Policy Forum. (2006). Transnational Corporations. 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/index.htm 
International Accounting Standards Board. (2004a). Frequently asked questions. 
http://www.iasb.org/about/faq.asp?showPageContent=no&xml=18_20_24_171220
03.htm 
International Accounting Standards Board. (2004b). IASB and IASC Foundation 
news.http://www.iasb.org/news/index.asp?showPageContent=no&xml=10_249_25
_09122004_31122009.htm 
International Accounting Standards Board. (2004c). IASB issues Standard on the 
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources. 
http://www.iasb.org/news/iasb.asp?showPageContent=no&xml=10_249_29_09122
004.htm 
International Accounting Standards Board. (2006a). Extractive activities research 
project 
  
 27
http://www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/Extractive+Activities/Summ
ary.htm 
International Accounting Standards Board. (2006b). Information for observers.  
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/85DCC84F-BC45-4B75-AC25-
2050E159E06E/0/Extract0610ob04.pdf 
International Accounting Standards Committee. (2000a). Extractive Industries Issues 
Paper. http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_files/documents/16_16_iss_sum.pdf 
International Accounting Standards Committee. (2000b). IASC Insight, December. 
IASC, London, UK. 
International Accounting Standards Committee. (2001). Extractive Industries Issues 
Paper: Comment letters. http://www.iasb.org/current/comment_letters_iasc.asp 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation. (2003). IASB Project 
Summary: Extractive Industries. 
http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_files/documents/16_16_iss_sum.pdf 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation. (2004). Exposure Draft: 
ED6 exploration for and evaluation of mineral resources. 
http://www.iasb.org/current/iasb.asp?showPageContent=no&xml=16_88_67_0605
2004.htm 
Johnston, D. (2005). Modern reserve disclosure. Petroleum Accounting and Financial 
Management Journal, 24(2), 23-30. 
Katz, L.C. (1985). Oil and gas: A compromise method of accounting. Journal of 
Accountancy, 159(6), 116-124. 
KPMG. (2001), Comment letter. 
http://www.iasb.org/current/comment_letters_iasc.asp 
Luther, R. (1996). The development of accounting regulation in the extractive 
industries. The International Journal of Accounting. 31(1), 67-93. 
Macintosh, N.B. & Baker, C.R. (2002). A literary theory perspective on accounting: 
Towards heteroglossic accounting reports. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 15(2), 184-222. 
Micallef, F. (2001). A black hole? Australian CPA. 71(11), 72-73. 
Neveling, N. (2005). Trouble in the pipeline for oil companies. 
http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2141720/trouble-pipeline 
Oil Industry Accounting Committee. (2001). Comment letter. 
http://www.iasb.org/current/comment_letters_iasc.asp 
Pratt, K. (1990). Accounting for the value of oil and gas reserves. Management 
Accounting, 68(9), 18-21. 
Rappaport, A. (1977). Economic impact of accounting standards: Implications for the 
FASB. Journal of Accountancy, May, 89-98. 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group. (2004), Annual Report 
http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=investor-en&FC2=/investor-
en/html/iwgen/leftnavs/zzz_lhn11_1_0.html&FC3=/investor-
en/html/iwgen/publications/annual_reports/2004/dir_2004_annualreport.html 
Solomons, D. (1978). The politicisation of accounting. Journal of Accountancy, 
146(5), 65-72. 
Van Riper, R. (1994). Setting Standards for Financial Reporting: FASB and the 
Struggle for Control of a Critical Process, Quorum Books, Connecticut, USA. 
Walker, R.G. (1987). Australia's ASRB: A case study of political activity and 
regulatory 'capture'. Accounting and Business Research, 17(67), 269-286. 
Whittred, G., Zimmer, I. & Taylor, S. (1996), Financial Accounting: Incentive Effects 
and Economic Consequences, Harcourt Brace & Company, Sydney, Australia. 
  
 28
Wise, T. & Spear, N. (2000). Accounting for extractive industries: An Australian 
perspective. Petroleum Accounting and Financial Management Journal, 19(1), 30-
53. 
Wise, T. & Spear, N. (2002). Factors and forces of the extractive industry 
environment, and their implications for accounting measurement and financial 
reporting. Petroleum Accounting and Financial Management Journal, 21(3), 1-28. 
World Bank. (2005). World Development Indicators 2005. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentM
DK:20523710~hlPK:1365919~menuPK:64133159~pagePK:64133150~piPK:6413
3175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 
Zeff, S.A. (1978). The rise of 'economic' consequences. Journal of Accountancy, 
146(6), 56-63. 
 
 
 
 
 
